I. Introduction
Since the early 1970s with the formation of environmental regulatory agencies in many European states, there has been a lively debate about how best to regulate chemicals, including metals, food additives and preservatives, as well as certain foods themselves 1 . Should regulations be based on a hazard classification (that is the potential for a substance, activity or process to cause harm or adverse effect) or a risk (a combination of the likelihood and the severity of a substance, activity or process to cause harm) assessment
23
? In other words, should regulators ban substances that have an intrinsic ability to cause harm, or should they examine whether there is a real probability that these substances will actually cause harm, in part based on exposure 4 ? To be clear hazard assessment and risk assessment are not mutually exclusive. In order to assess risks, it is necessary to first understand the hazard, so advocates of risk-based regulation are dependent on hazard classification taking place. The key component of the debate centres around whether regulatory decision-making can/should be based on hazard classification alone, eschewing risk assessment. From an economics perspective, decision making on the basis of just hazard classification usually ignores impact assessment, which is a distinct factor and in so doing often contributes to poor regulatory policy-making 5 .
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Some environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and environmental lobby groups denounce risk assessments and argue for more hazard-based controls. For example, the International Chemical Secretariat, one such NGO based in Gothenburg, Sweden, argues against risk assessment noting: "The basis for risk assessment is the un-scientific belief that risk can be foreseen and controlled. In an infinitely complex system, such as chemicals, the risk is simply impossible to anticipate. 6 
"
It is clear that in Europe there has been a rather long, and at times acrimonious discussion, as to the merits of risk assessments for regulatory purposes especially with regard to chemical substances. Indeed until the early 1990s neither risk assessment nor risk management featured in European law 7 . In the case C-180/96 UK v. Commission in 1998, for example, there was no mention of the term risk assessment 8 . During the 1980s and 1990s some Member States eagerly adopted the risk assessment methodology. In 1995, for example, the Health Council of the Netherlands took the view that risk assessment was an integral part of the policy-making process . Risk assessment as a key policy-making tool was accepted in the early 1980s in the UK and made more popular due to the seminal 1983 Royal Society study on the topic 10 . Similarly, regulatory agencies in a number of smaller Member States came to accept risk assessment methodologies and most of these now follow the risk assessment guidelines outlined by the United Nations Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO)
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. In other European nations, however, the use of hazard classifications has dominated the regulatory discussions. Particularly interesting was the decision to use hazard classifications in the formulation of Sweden's goal to develop a toxic-free society by the year 2020
12
, as it arguably served as a basis for the development of the European Union's (EU) Chemical White Paper of 2001 13 14 15 . The first significant use of risk assessment in the EU was associated with the 1993 Existing Substances Regulation 16 . However, arguably it did not grow in popularity until the early part of this century following the Commission's publication of its Communication on the precautionary principle
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. This was in part due to the need to regain regulatory legitimacy in Europe following considerable criticism 18 19 , as well as to proactively address the call for harmonisation of this and related risk-based tools by the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 20 . Indeed in that same year the European Commission published its path breaking study First Report on the Harmonisation of Risk Assessment Procedures which had an aim to: "…promote an active debate on current practices for risk assessment used by the Scientific Committees of DG SANCO and to make proposals for developing convergent approaches which will aid harmonisation 21 
".
The use of risk assessments and science-based risk management tools began to gain further ground in 2002 with the growing popularity of the so-called "Better Regulation Agenda" and with it the use of regulatory impact assessments (RIAs). These were seen as mechanisms to reduce regulatory burdens within the Commission and elsewhere 22 . In the same year the Commission adopted the General Food Law (GFL) 23 . The GFL followed the Commission's White Paper on Food Safety, which in turn was prompted by a number of food scandals, most notably the spread of BSE (mad cow disease) in Europe. It called for the separation of risk assessment from the riskmanagement process as a way to regain the trust of European food consumers 24 . This risk assessment/ management separation led to the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Since 2002 this Authority has become the eminent scientific risk-assessment authority for food policy issues in Europe and has been involved in a number of controversial issues ranging from genetically modified foods to Bisphenol A 25 . As a result there has been a rich and far ranging discussion regarding risk assessment within the European food sector involving academics, stakeholders, regulators and industry 26 . These discussions have not spread widely to other regulatory domains, however. There has, for example, been limited case law discussing the use of risk assessment and management tools in setting regulation in the non food sector, with the Pfizer, Alpha Pharma and Gowan cases being notable exceptions 27 28 .
In Europe, many food, pharmaceutical and health regulators as well as policy makers are concerned about basing regulations on hazard classifications and implementing them via tools such as the precautionary principle "better safe than sorry"
29
. 
II. Background -risk vs hazard
What are some of the criticisms of risk assessments and hazard classifications and how long have they been used in influencing policy making? These questions are addressed in this section
A brief history of risk assessment
The tools and ideas used in risk assessment have been around for millennia, determining everything to whether housing in Babylon was safe, to estimat- 36 These interviews were not recorded but summarized after the meeting in question. The information gleaned from them was primarily used to assist the author to gain a wider understanding of the regulatory environment in the country or agency in question. When a regulatory or policy maker was quoted in the text below, this was done so anonymously. Prior to scientific peer review the draft article was sent to the regulators and policy makers who were interviewed to ensure factual correctness.
ing shipping loss in the middle-ages and understanding the probability of gambling
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. It did not start to gain regulatory importance until the 1950s, however, when it was seen as a useful tool in predicting failure of space bound vessels, as well as understanding the safety of nuclear power stations and chemical plants, work place safety, public health and environmental hazards 38 . Today risk assessments, based on toxicological and or epidemiological data, are used as a basis for many environmental and health regulations throughout the world 39 . 
History of hazard classification

Confusing risk with hazard
What makes the discussion rather more complicated, however, is that the public and many stakeholders confuse the terms risk and hazard, particularly when applied to chemicals 45 . In a detailed study by Peter Wiedemann and his colleagues for the German Federal Risk Assessment Bureau, more than 80 % of German respondents confused the terms 46 . This is further complicated by the fact that most of the research done in the field of risk analysis is primarily American in origin. Until recently, 90 % of all research in the risk field was carried out in the United States for public and private bodies
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. As a result the whole language around risk assessment is grounded in English, where there is a clear linguistic distinction between risk and hazard. That crucial linguistic distinction is not the same in Dutch, German or in Swedish, for example, which leads to greater confusion. As a case in point, the Swedish language does not have an expression for hazard, but rather the closest word is "fara" which means danger.
Criticisms of risk and hazard
One of the main problems with hazard classifications are that they are only one initial part of the risk analysis process. That is to say, policy makers can take the decision to ban certain chemicals and metals on the assumption or idea that they may be hazardous without testing whether this is actually . Although risk assessments are more comprehensive to their very nature than hazard classifications, they are not always pure scientific affairs. In cases when there are high levels of scientific uncertainty, expert judgements are often used, which in turn can at times be incorrect 54 . Finally, as risk assessment are often expensive and time consuming, critics argue that they can be open to abuse by external bodies who may benefit from delay -for example, by injecting some form of scientific uncertainty they can delay regulation yet further. This does not therefore necessarily lead to better regulatory decisions 55 56 .
III. The two case studies
To address the question of how European and national authorities actually regulate risk, two case studies were selected for examination following discussions with policy makers and regulators in both Brussels and London. Selection was based on the following criteria: a) Is the case in question "European" in scope? That is has it been discussed in multiple Member States as well as within the European Commission? b) Is it comparatively easy to get data on the case? Is there information in the public domain that can be gathered and analysed? c) Are policy makers, stakeholders and regulators willing to speak about the case in question? and d) Have the selected case studies received at least some media attention, ensuring that the non specialists interviewed will have a basic understanding of the topic at hand? the manufacture of epoxy resins. These resins were turned into long lasting and durable coatings found on anything from steel drums to false teeth. By 1957 chemists were using BPA in the manufacturing of hard, transparent, and rather heat resistant plastic material called polycarbonate to replace glass containers for food and electronic products, including baby bottles
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. The epoxy resins found in packaging materials serve a variety of purposes. They act as a protective lining on the inside of metal-based food and beverage cans, halting the corrosion of cans and limiting the contamination of foods. When used in bottles polycarbonate can increase heat resistance and durability. Most studies indicate that BPA in food packaging provides high level of food safety and value to food supply 60 . The controversy surrounding BPA began in the early 1990s when a number of researchers at Stanford University in the United States realised that the chemical was migrating from the plastic (polycarbonate) laboratory bottles into the water that they were using
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. This sparked concern that BPA might be migrating from packaging used for consumer products and that BPA, similar to other artificial and natural hormones (e.g. female birth-control pills), might also be an endocrine disrupter. At this time, endocrine disruption was starting to be much discussed in both the US and Europe by policy makers, regulators and academics following the publication of a number of books and articles, most notably Our Stolen Future 62 . One researcher who is highly active in the field of endocrine disruption is Dr. Frederic vom Saal of the University of Missouri, who began testing artificial oestrogens, including BPA, following the Stanford findings. His first paper on the topic, published in 1997, indicated higher than anticipated oestrogen responses 63 . Since this initial study, Dr. vom Saal and his colleagues at the University of Missouri have carried out a number of small scale studies on mice (and more recently in-vitro) examining how they respond to low doses of BPA. To date the majority of these studies have not been replicated by other researchers 64 . Most of these studies were carried out on a small number of mice and did not therefore meet the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined Good Laboratory Practice (GLP). However, they indicate that very low levels of exposure to BPA, via injection into the blood stream of mice or (less often) given to them orally, may have significant health effects including reproductive abnormalities, obesity, breast and prostate cancer and neurobehavioral problems in mice 65 66 . The studies by vom Saal and his colleagues did not initially change the regulatory policy climate regarding the safety of BPA. Regulators in the US (the FDA in particular) and elsewhere (e.g. the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) examined the research findings but viewed them as somewhat unreliable
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. They suffered from a combination of lack of reproducibility and small sample sizes. The studies focused on low doses and primarily addressed injection into the blood stream rather than oral administration, which may have better reflected real-world consumption 68 . The supposed level of BPA uptake is significantly different depending on the method of administration. 
"
This consensus statement combined with vom Saal's active media work and outcries from some environmental groups started to change the nature of the debate regarding the safety of BPA.
By mid 2008, several policy makers responding to expressions of public concern and media pressures, began arguing for local and country-wide bans of BPA-containing plastics. In October 2008, following a number of critical BPA articles in the Toronto Globe and Mail referencing the work of vom Saal and others, Health Canada (the Canadian food and health regulator) took the ground breaking decision to ban BPA from baby bottles citing the precautionary principle 74 . Following the baby bottle ban in Canada, increased pressure was put on the European bodies to ban BPA-containing plastic containers used by small children as well. Due in part to the international pressure there have been five scientific evaluations of the safety of BPA in Europe all indicating that the dangers of BPA leaching out from baby bottles and other mechanisms have been overstated. This, however, has not stopped critics from questioning the EFSA's findings. The issue is complicated by the fact that the opponents to BPA continue to attack scientific findings that do not agree with the earlier low dose findings, taking the view that regulatory agencies base their decisions on outdated guidelines that were established 50 years ago
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. In addition, in 2010 there was a heated debate in the journal Toxicological Sciences regarding the effects of BPA as an endocrine disrupter in rats. One three-year study showed that feeding pregnant rats BPA at doses 4000 times higher than the maximum exposure to humans produced no adverse effects; while the positive control group of pregnant rats fed with the synthetic oestrogen used in birth controls 
c. Risk versus hazard and BPA
The discussions surrounding how to best regulate BPA have been largely based on a debate around whether to use risk or hazard classifications. Some regulators that have established controls based on data produced by small non-GLP studies 86 , rather than large conclusive ones, using the argument that the substance is an endocrine disruptor and therefore can cause a hazard. This hazard classification is in their view sufficient for a ban. However, other regulators, most notably the EFSA and the UK Food Standards Agency, rely on the large studies that are available and also take into account exposure to make the judgement that current safety standards are acceptable.
Brominated flame retardants -
The case of Deca-BDE a. Background
Over the last hundred years there have been moves away from wood and metal products to synthetic carbon-based polymers with high fuel values, including automotive parts, textiles, furniture fabrics and housings for electronic equipment and surface coatings of other materials
87
. Because of the high fuel values of these substances (plastics for example are mostly petrol-based products) in combination with the fact that they are often located near or part of heat and electricity sources (e.g. televisions and computers) there has been a significant amount of legislation introducing ever stricter fire safety requirements associated with the use of these appliances and other products. One of the most popular ways to satisfy these requirements is through the use of flame retardants, and of these brominated types account for 32 % of all those used 88 . The popularity of brominated flame retardants (BFRs) is down to their inherent thermal stability, overall strong performance (compared to the alternatives) and cost effectiveness 89 . As modern day flame retardants are found in a wide array of products, both in homes and businesses, they are widely dispersed. Because they can be removed through leaching, abrasion or volatilisation, and are inherently stable -they are designed to last for the life time of a product, they can, albeit in small amounts, be found more or less anywhere 90 . To make matters worse, some flame retardants are bio-accumulative
91
. As a result there are health and environmental concerns regarding the use of flame retardants, particularly brominated ones. These are particularly stable and have a high affinity for fats compared to other flame retardants, tending towards a greater degree of bio-accumulation 92 . These concerns have led to generalisations made about bromi- 
b. Political and public outcry
There has been a considerable amount of pressure from NGOs, policy makers and regulators to ban and substitute BFRs, because of the bio-accumulation issue. This pressure has been particularly strong in the Nordic countries where there have been a number of leading research institutions looking into the hazards of BFRs
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, and strong support from environmental NGOs, regulators (such as the Swedish Chemical Agency) and other bodies. BFRs have also received a significant amount of media attention following the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) bio-monitoring (blood) campaigns which show that we have some BFRs in our bodies, leading to further media amplification and rising public concern 106 . These concerns are based on the hazard as opposed to any calculation of the actual risk.
c. Risk versus hazard
BFRs, and in particular Deca-BDEs, have been regulated in Europe based on a hazard. Arguably Deca-BDE has been banned from electronic goods and products based on the so-called class stigmatisation effect
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. In a classic article on the topic, Gregory et al. argue that the initial cause of technological stigma is some form of event or occurrence that becomes amplified by the media, sending a strong signal of abnormal risk. Stigmatised products usually have highly hazardous properties and are perceived negatively by the public 108 . Deca-BDE ticked all of these boxes. There have been a multitude of scientific studies, most of them based on small samples and drawn up in laboratory facilities rather than actual field exercises and making in some cases allegedly unsubstantiated claims
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. In addition Deca-BDE is often clumped together with the other BFRs that do have certain hazardous properties as discussed previously, and research shows high levels of public concern towards these type of chemicals 110 111 .
Risk and hazard assessmentIs it predictable?
In both of these case studies hazard was advocated to justify bans. Both cases carry a strong Scandinavian flavour -that is to say that either Denmark and/ or Sweden were heavily involved for pushing for the ban of both chemicals. 
IV. Discussion and analysis
The two case studies show significant inconsistencies in the application of risk and hazard assessments for regulation setting throughout Europe. EU Member States have different concerns about risk topics. UK authorities, for example, worry about fires while Swedish policy makers are concerned by man-made chemicals. What are the reasons for these differentiating cultural views on regulations, and what are the consequences of them? Is more dialogue between regulators and policy makers needed?
The pushers and pullers for chemical and environmental regulation
Although Europe is now seen as the leading environmental regulator in the world 115 all European Member States do not agree with the regulations put forward by the European authorities. Rather it is more the case that some nations attempt to win green credit by attempting to ban certain chemical substances. As these nations are members of the wider European Union, it makes no sense to push only for a domestic ban, as there is always the legal threat that the European Union could call for a ban to be revoked (as was the case with Sweden putting forward an unilateral ban on Deca-BDE a few years ago). Rather these Member States try to win over their domestic audiences by pushing through European-wide bans. For example, the Swedish socialist MEP, Asa Westlund, argued as part of her re-election campaign that she was helping the Swedes from being inundated by dangerous chemicals by her political efforts in the European Parliament 116 . Indeed, Danish and Swedish regulatory authorities are widely regarded as the pioneers of present day EU chemical regulation 117 118 . These Member States have also put forward European legislation to ban Deca-BDE (Denmark led the effort in getting the Deca-BDE exemption revoked), the phase-out of antibiotics in animal feed
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, as well as a host of other chemicals (e.g., paraquat)
120 . The reason why these Scandinavian regulatory bodies have been so successful in their European banning efforts is a combination of three distinct factors.
a. The rise of the post-trust society
Regulators who are seen to be tough on industry, such as the Swedish Chemicals Agency (KemI), have a high level of public credibility, as they are viewed to have the public's best interest at heart 121 . Therefore the decisions they make, some based on good science and others based on weak science, are not questioned by policy makers, academics or other stakeholders. Some regulators, on the other hand, who are seen to be influenced by industry are viewed by the public and stakeholders as weak, are less trusted and are increasingly marginalised. Similarly, policies and scientific arguments put forward by "low-trust" bodies, such as the chemical industry and its consultants, even though they may be based on stronger scientific evidence than those made by the Scandinavian reg- ulators, are increasingly being questioned by stakeholders, academics and other bodies 122 . Industry can no longer be trusted as they have vested interests in the product being questioned, and increasingly industry funding is seen as biased 123 . Industry's credibility has not been helped by the fact that a number of industry bodies have misused science to delay the regulation of hazardous substances such as tobacco, a fact that has only became widely known over the past fifteen years or so 124 . Finally the accusers, that is primarily academics and stakeholders, have been gaining public and political credibility following a number of European scandals ranging from BSE (mad cow disease) to dioxin in Belgian chickens and tainted blood in France 125 . This is a profound shift compared to just over 30 years ago, when the public more or less expected a close working relationship between regulators and industry 126 . Due to these three reasons it has become easier for nations such as Denmark and Sweden to push through regulation as they are trusted, while their industry counterparts are not. In addition these Scandinavian regulators have been, and continue to be, ably assisted by stakeholders and academics who are also trusted. Following the passing of the Lisbon Treaty granting increased power to the European Parliament, it is likely that it will be even easier to push through tough hazard-based regulations.
b. Lack of interest in environmental regulatory
issues on the centre right Setting Scandinavian countries aside, the call for tougher European chemical and environmental regulations is coming unsurprisingly primarily from politicians that are from the centre left, left and the greens
127
. The Greens, for example, have one main platform, that of promoting tougher environmental regulation, while the EPP parliamentarians spend a large amount of their time focusing on a number of economically-based platforms, be it internal markets, competition or trade policy
128 . There are a number of examples of this. The rapporteur for the European Parliament's report on the European Commission's 2001 Chemical White Paper was a Swedish Green MEP, Inger Schorling, while the rapporteur on the REACH Regulation was Guido Sacconi, an Italian Socialist MEP. Similarly, the European Greens have a political spokesperson (a former director of Greenpeace Germany) whose role is to debate, lobby and push forward tougher environmental regulation. The Centre right parliamentarians do not have a similar spokesperson to counter these arguments.
c. The politics of regulation
Politicians will push for bans or fight for certain environmental/chemical/ energy issues which do not affect the economic well being of their country. Sweden has strong positions on phasing out chemicals which it can afford to do as it has only a small chemical industry 129 . Similarly, Austria richly endowed with hydropower, has a strong anti-nuclear policy. Its Eastern neighbours, Czech Republic and Slovakia, do not have the Alps and are therefore to a greater extent reliant on nuclear power 130 . At the same time Sweden would not dream of having tough controls on mobile telephone base stations as one of the world's largest mobile telephone systems providers, Ericsson, is based there
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. In other words, it is easy for Denmark and Sweden to take strong Anti-BPA and Anti-Deca-BDE positions at the European level as there are no economic consequences for their domestic markets in doing so, and at the same time they gain domestic "green" credentials. An example of this political game playing is one Swedish EPP MEP who put forward a parliamentary question on the 27 th May 2010 asking how the Commission will safeguard against imports of BPA material to the EU (following the Swedish agenda on chemicals). On 3rd September she put forward a question on how the Commission will safeguard an important part of Swedish heritage, namely the fermented Baltic herring, by extending the exemption past 2011, acknowledging in her question the fact that the herring contains higher levels of dioxin than the European Union allows 132 . When politicians push for these types of bans (or exemptions from a ban) on the European stage the economic consequences are significant. The chemical industry, for example, is Europe's fourth largest industrial sector and is particularly significant for Germany. It accounts for 11 % of Europe's manufacturing capacity, and employs 1.6 million individuals
133
. Strong opposition from those nations who are affected by these bans and regulations would be expected, but in many cases this has not been the case. Denmark, for example, was able to push through the annulment of the Deca-BDE exemption in the face of UK opposition, Sweden was able to drive through the ban of the pesticide paraquat, and REACH was passed following modest policy changes on the part of the Germans 134 .
Ignoring the risk-risk trade-off
The so-called risk-risk trade-off occurs when a regulator focuses on decreasing one specific risk (e.g., chlorinating drinking water to make it safer) and unintentionally increases a risk elsewhere (e.g., human cancers caused by substances being generated during the chlorination). Over the years risk-risk tradeoffs have been and are frequently ignored by regulators, be they based in Europe, North America or elsewhere. This is despite the fact that over the years there have been a number of studies from authorative sources stating that they need to be properly and systematically addressed in the making of regulations
137
. Both the case studies discussed above are riddled with risk-risk tradeoffs. With regard to the ban on Deca-BDE two issues stand out. The ban is being put in place because of environmental and public concerns associated with other BFRs, yet to date there appears to have been no studies demonstrating the consequences of the ban in terms of increased appliance fires. Similarly, it is not the case that Deca-BDE can be simply substituted for safer and better proven retardants 138 . Deca BDE is one of the world's most studied flame retardants, yet the alternatives being promoted, such as phosphorous-based compounds have not been equally studied. Would it not be wise to do more in-depth studies examining the possible environmental and health risks associated with those phosphorus-based flame retardants before the substitution principle can be activated
139
? With regard to BPA, aside from replacing BPA plastic baby bottles with glass ones (and resulting problems associated with consequences of breakage) manufacturers have in many cases struggled to find suitable alternatives. In addition, these alternatives have not been tested and researched to the same degree as BPA, and may in fact be riskier for human health and the environment 140 . The causes of these unintentional risk-risk tradeoffs are two fold. Firstly, special interest groups focused on single source pollution end points rather than the broader environmental problem at hand 141 . Secondly, the risk-risk trade-offs were in these two cases products of incomplete, and to a certain degree unscientific, decision making. Regulations were driven too quickly without taking into account all the possible unintended consequences, by political, media and stakeholder concerns rather than evidencebased policy making -sometimes referred to as the "risk of the month concern"
142 . As a result, the so called substitution principle is not a risk free solution as some regulators imply 143 .
The many cultures of Europe
Europe is not one entity, but the European Union is made up of 27 Member States populated with individuals who have different values and ideas. This in turn complicates matters for the making of consistent environmental chemical regulations. Be it with regard to environmental issues or food concerns, there is not one united Europe 144 . The Swedes, for example, are more concerned about the welfare of farmed animals than the Hungarians; while the Latvians are much more worried about the freshness of food than the Dutch. Similarly, the Portuguese worry more about genetically modified food than the British do 145 . These types of cultural differences will impact on regulation.
The silo effect of regulatory agencies
Research for this study has identified a problematic lack of communication between domestic regulators working on similar issues and between member State regulators targeting similar issues. With regard to BPA, the Swedish Chemical Agency (KemI) had a different perspective on how this chemical should be regulated to their counterparts at the Swedish Food Agency (SLV). The KemI wants to regulate based on a hazard classifications and the precautionary principle, while the SLV wants to use a risk assessment and risk management approach. If the precautionary principle is to be used, the SLV is insisting on a EU-agreed definition that includes a clause for cost effectiveness, which would require some sort of risk assessment 146 , while the KemI did not have a definition as such. The same split with regard to BPA occurred in Denmark where the Danish Food Agency was forced to call for a temporary ban for political rather than scientific (risk analysis) reasons. The study also showed that there was a lack of coordination on the use and type of risk assessments with regard to BPA or Deca-BDE, be the regulators based in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden or the UK. The regulators did not know what their counterparts were doing on these issues.
The stigmatisation of products
A number of environmental regulators, environmental stakeholders and academics are attempting to stigmatise particular products, such as Deca-BDE and BPA. These groups do two things. hence these substances can simply be substituted for something better. They do not go into any detail about the possible negative environmental and public health consequences of the substitute products. In so doing they put pressure on corporations to shift from one chemical compound to another, as demonstrated by the International Chemical Secretariat overview of electronics without brominated flame retardants
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. These campaigns are increasingly successful. The plastic's industry in Europe, for example, has been removing BPA from baby bottles as it anticipated a European wide ban on the chemical 150 .
Public perceptions of chemicals
Over the past 40 years there has been much social science research discussing why the public perceives some risks differently to others
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. This research shows, for example, that the public is more concerned about involuntary risks than voluntary ones, it fears technological hazards more than natural ones, and that it is more frightened of unfamiliar than familiar risks 152 . Chemicals tick all these boxes: they are involuntary, technical and highly unfamiliar, with most members of the public not having much information on, or understanding the use of, the chemical in question. In addition, science shows that these types of unfamiliar, technological and involuntary risks are often socially amplified by the media 153 154 . As a result the public is on the whole worried about the effects of chemicals. The whole situation has been made more complicated by environmental campaigners, academics and journalists. They have launched controversial and highly publicised campaigns against chemicals including BPA and Deca-BDE, through bio-monitoring schemes (be it blood or breast milk) to gain yet further media attention
155
. Is it therefore any wonder that the public is fearful of BPA and Deca BDE, which in turn justifies the environmental groups' campaigns?
V. Recommendations
As seen in the two case studies, there is no such thing as uniform European-wide science-based risk regulation. Rather there are multiple actors at different member state and European levels pushing their own views and opinions of how regulations should be formed, resulting in the passing of bans/directives and regulations that are at times hazard based and at other times risk based. What is needed to ensure greater consistency in the European regulatory process? What is needed to ensure greater science-and risk-based regulatory thinking? This final section will address these questions.
Importance of education
If European regulators are to be successful in increasingly basing environmental and health regulations on risk assessments then there is a need for the public and stakeholders to actually understand what risk assessment is, something that is clearly not the case at the present time. One way around this would be to push for the introduction of risk assessment as part of the science curriculum in the final years of school (last two years of high school/gymnasium) as well as by encouraging European universities to teach risk assessment as part of the undergraduate or graduate curriculums, something that the Commission is also actively promoting 156 . At the present time there is little teaching activity on this topic with just a handful of universities teaching risk assessment. What is interesting is that there is clearly a demand for such courses. Because of new regulations such as REACH, there are more risk assessments than ever before being performed in Europe. To generate funding in the risk assessment area it would be good for a number of academic institutions to encourage the Commission's DG Research and Innovation to host a workshop on this topic to see what such a proposed funding stream in this area would look like.
Scientific peer review of risk assessments used for regulations
One way to ensure that the risk assessments being put forward by regulators remain of the highest quality (and therefore cannot be undermined by stakeholders and special interest groups) is to ensure that the risk assessments and other underlying scientific arguments used as the foundations for the environmental and health regulations are based on appropriate peer review. ."
The then Administrator of OIRA, Professor John Graham, was concerned about the varying quality of the underlying science used in the development of regulations and felt that by having a peer review system in place, the overall policy decisions could be improved. The Bulletin was signed into law in December 2004, after having benefited from extensive agency, stakeholder and public comments on two prior drafts. The idea is probably worth introducing in Europe, as long as the peer review guidelines are developed in tandem with a number of key regulatory agencies so they have some ownership of the project and are not merely dictated to by a central oversight authority. One way to proceed with the introduction of an EU wide peer review bulletin would be to bring together a number of key EU risk assessment institutions such as the EFSA, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, the UK Food Standards Advisory Board (COT) and DG SANCO to discuss the proposal.
Media guidelines
The European public does not need to be "educated" in the way that many policy makers seem to believe 158 . Rather many public outcries or alarms that are prevalent in today's Europe are perpetuated by undue media attention and amplification of risks which could be better and more responsibly communicated 159 . Was it ethically correct, for example, for the Independent to publish a series of alarmist articles on the supposed dangers of BPA in April 2010? The articles were not scientifically balanced and were arguably designed to put pressure on the UK FSA to regulate it. Other examples of unnecessary media amplification include the mishandling of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine scare in the UK 160 and the communication of the Y2K or millennium computer bug 161 . Effective media amplification in such cases is often undermined by poor handling of science, not helped by the fact that due to recent budget cuts there are less and less broadsheet science editors than ever before.
One way of addressing poor communication would be through the development of reporting guidelines, similar to those agreed by the BBC in 2003 162 and by Harvard and IFIC 163 that would help journalists to become more attuned to communication pitfalls 164 . Another way to do so would be to use more sciencemedia forums to encourage greater critical dialogue between scientists and journalists on topics such as the intricacies of risk assessment, such as those promoted by the European Science Forum. rather than risk is the simple fact that the promoters of hazard classifications are better communicators of the potentially resulting risk in question 165 . In addition it should be noted that hazard classification is easier to communicate than risk assessment, as because it is less complicated, as given that elements of uncertainty (in particular linked to exposure) are not discussed. These stakeholders are in many cases professional public relations machines that excel in courting media attention and framing public opinion, debate and controversy. By being fast and nimble they can consistently engage in proactive risk communication attuned to the demands of a 24-hour news cycle, and they understand that the public perceives some risks more than others 166 . What makes them even more effective is that in many cases they are more trusted than the regulators and the risk imposers (usually industry) 167 
.
Regulators and policy makers, on the other hand, are generally poor communicators. Indeed, apart from anything else, they are often too slow to communicate, because in many cases held back by the vast bureaucratic machinery that makes up most government departments. By being slow in their communication strategies officials spend more time firefighting and engaging in reactive communications. The problem with this strategy is that reactive risk communication destroys public trust whereas proactive risk communication gains public trust 168 . This is complicated by the fact that many regulatory bodies do not understand the importance of risk perception and staff has not been trained in risk communication. They therefore often find it difficult to convey clear and concise messages needed for the modern media. To address this problem, regulators could either be encouraged to participate in existing continuing education risk communication courses for professionals such as those developed by Harvard University, or by developing customised risk-communication and risk-analysis guidelines, something that the EFSA is presently doing 169 .
Establish a scientific advisory board for the European Parliament
There is a need to increase the scientific competency of the European Parliament. Based on the interviews with European Commission officials, European parliamentarians and senior officials in the Member States, there is a clear growing concern that in line with increased parliamentarian power, there needs to be an increased understanding of the science underlying the amendments, laws and suggestions that parliamentarians are making. One key way of helping parliamentarians gaining this competence would be through the establishment of a neutral/independent scientific advisory board that would produce opinions and suggestions on the various proposed directives and regulations made by the Commission. This advisory board could work in close collaboration with the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) panel within the European Parliament.
Properly interpreting and implementing the Commission's communication on the precautionary principle
The seminal European Commission Communication on the precautionary paper needs to be properly interpreted and implemented. When it was published the Commission noted that the Communication should be seen as an "input into the ongoing debate" 170 rather than the definitive statement on the topic. Since that time there have been multiple studies evaluating the usefulness of the Communication 171 and whether the Commission is actually following the Communication 172 . One of the key provisos was that any invocation of the precautionary principle must be preceded by a risk assessment
173
. These published studies, along with the case studies discussed above indicate that the Communication is in many cases being ignored. Different guidelines and legal cases are being agreed on without a clear coherent policy as to when the Commission should be using risk assessments let alone the precautionary principle. To address these ambiguities, there is a need to form an independent academic expert group that would discuss and describe how the Communication should best be interpreted and implemented. The outcome of such an independent study would need to be launched in the European Parliament with the backing of senior parliamentarians and Commission officials. In the interviews that were conducted with riskbased policy makers and regulators in Scandinavia it was clear that they needed a meeting place to discuss the present developments in the risk analysis field. 
VI. Conclusions
The regulation of chemicals and food is never easy, particularly when regulators and policy makers are increasingly distrusted by the public 175 . It is much more complicated when chemical and food regulations become politicised. In this time of greater regulatory uncertainty, there is a need to examine the inconsistencies that are prevalent in Europe to see what can best be done to address them. It is hoped that this paper, highlighting two complex cases of BPA and Deca BDE, and by putting forward a series of policy relevant recommendations ranging from educating the public in risk assessment, to using scientific peer review of risk assessments, to promoting Europeanwide media guidelines, to improving the risk communication capacity and competencies of regulators in Europe, will assist in the making of more scientific and risk-based European-wide policy making.
